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NONMARITAL CHILDREN AND POST-DEATH
PARENTAGE: A DIFFERENT PATH FOR
INHERITANCE LAW?
Paula A. Monopoli °

I.

INTRODUCTION

The number of children born out of wedlock in this
country has increased dramatically since the first half of the
twentieth century.1 In 1940, there were 89,500 out-ofwedlock births,2 while by 2005, that number had increased to
more than 1.5 million. 3 Children born out of wedlock
(hereinafter "nonmarital children") 4 were originally barred
* Marbury Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law;
B.A., Yale College, 1980; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1983. The
author would like to thank Susan McCarty for her research assistance with this
Article. She would also like to thank Marin Scordato and her colleagues at the
University of Maryland School of Law Faculty Workshop for their valuable
insights.
1. The percentage of nonmarital births increased substantially over the
last thirty years, from 10.7% in 1970 to 33.0% in 1999. Stephanie J. Ventura &
Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearingin the United States, 1940-99,
NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Oct. 18, 2000, at 17 tbl.1, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48-16.pdf. The increase continued
in 2005, when the percentage of nonmarital births in 2005 was 36.9%. Joyce A.
Martin et al., Births: Final Datafor 2005, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 5, 2007,
at 2, availableat http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56-06.pdf.
2. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., ESSENTIALS FOR ATTY'S IN CHILD SUPP. ENFORCEMENT ch. 1,
para.
12
(3d
ed.
2002),
available
at
http'//www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2002/reports/essentials.
3. Martin et al., supra note 1, at 2.
4. The law has evolved from using the term "bastard" for such children to
using the phrase "illegitimate," then to "out-of-wedlock," and most recently
"nonmarital."
See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the
NontraditionalFamily, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 112 n.64 (1996) (discussing the
Supreme Court's use of the term "children born out of wedlock" instead of
"illegitimates" in Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 856 (1986)); see id. (citing
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 supp. practice cmts. (McKinney Supp.
2008), which noted the "evolution of statutory language from 'child born out of
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from inheriting from or through either parent.5 American
jurisprudence evolved over time to give nonmarital children
greater rights, in part due to constitutional concerns about
treating such children differently from children born in
wedlock.6
The American system is still predominantly a statusbased system of inheritance and establishing a parent-child
link is at the core of this system.7 Behavior is not generally a
criterion.
While there are some exceptions to this rule,9
behavior-based models of inheritance raise efficiency and
administrative concerns, even though they tend to maximize
fairness.' ° As noted, there are more than a million American
children born out of wedlock each year.1"
American
2
jurisprudence has grown to embrace these children.
wedlock' to 'non-marital child,' representing 'another link in the chain of
linguistic tolerance that has caused the terminology to evolve from 'bastard' to
'illegitimate' to 'out of wedlock' to the eminently nonjudgmental 'non-marital'").
This linguistic evolution reflects the societal shift in attitudes toward such
children, and it runs parallel with the increase in inheritance (and other legal
rights) granted to such children in American jurisprudence. See id. at 105-12;
see also Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
643, 684 (2001) (stating that such children "have been gradually upgraded
terminologically from 'bastards' to 'illegitimate children' to 'nonmarital
children'").
5.

MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS

24-26 (1994).
6. See Brashier, supra note 4, at 105-12.
7. See Paula A. Monopoli, Deadbeat Dads: Should Support and Inheritance
be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 259 (1994).
8. See id.; see also Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigmof Inheritance
Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 230-31 (2001) [hereinafter Foster, Family Paradigm];
Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance:A New Model from China,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1203 (1999) [hereinafter Foster, New Model from
China]; Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?:
The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 80 n.7, 81 (1998)
[hereinafter Foster, Chinese Experiment].
9. The most common exception to the rule is the Slayer Rule, which bars
murderers from inheriting from their victims. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 250
(West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West 2008); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8802 (West 2005); VA. CODE. ANN. § 55-402 (2008). Currently, "[forty-eight]
states and the District of Columbia have such statutes, although there is terrific
variation between them." See also Linda Kelly Hill, No-Fault Death: Wedding
Inheritance Rights to Family Values, 94 KY. L.J. 319, 322 n.16 (2005-2006)
(listing additional state slayer statutes).
10. See Monopoli, supra note 7, at 273-91 (analyzing a behavior-based
system of inheritance).
11. See Martin et al., supra note 1, at 2 (citing 2005 statistics of 1,527,034
nonmarital births in the United States).
12. See Lili Mostofi, Legitimizing the Bastard: The Supreme Court's

2008]

859

NONMARITAL CHILDREN

The significant demographic shift in the number of
nonmarital births makes the issues surrounding nonmarital
children critical ones for society and inheritance law. 13 Most
of these children do not stand to inherit vast fortunes. They
are often born into middle income and low-income families. 4
Their parents and grandparents are the least likely segment
of the population to seek estate planning services and to opt
out of the default system of intestacy to draft an inclusive
will. This is the very reason why the rules of intestacy-the
default or off-the-rack rules of inheritance law-should be
streamlined to make it as easy for nonmarital children to
inherit as possible. The impact of what might appear to be a
small inheritance often proves very significant in the lives of
nonmarital children, both as minors and adults.
This article first explores how the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in this area has been weakened in
the face of scientific advances in paternity testing.
Secondly, it suggests that surrogate rules-rules which use
concepts like "open and notorious recognition" 6 to establish
parentage post-death-are less efficient and reliable than
genetic testing 7 and should be reduced to presumptions, 8 if
Treatment of the Illegitimate Child, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 453, 456-57
(1999).
13. See generally Kelly Musick & Robert D. Mare, Recent Trends in the
Inheritance of Poverty and Family Structure, 35 SOC. SCI. RES. 471, 472 (2006);
Alexis Yamokoski & Lisa A. Keister, The Wealth of Single Women: Marital
Status and Parenthoodin the Asset Accumulation of Young Baby Boomers in the
United States, 12 FEMINIST ECON. 167 (2006); Robert Haveman et al.,
IntergenerationalEffects of Nonmarital and Early Childbearing, in OUT OF
WEDLOCK:

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

OF NONMARITAL

FERTILITY 287

(Lawrence L. Wu & Barbara Wolfe eds., 2001).
14. See Musick & Mare, supra note 13, at 472; Saul D. Hoffmann & Michael
E. Foster, Economic Correlates of Nonmarital Childbearing Among Adult
Women, 29 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 137 (1997) (observing that nonmarital children
born to adult mothers-a growing segment of nonmarital children-are even
worse off financially than those born to teens).
15. See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for
Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 252 n.40 (2006)
(citing Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy:
Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 533 (1996); Mary R.
Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of
the Family: A ResearchAgenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215 (2002); Janet L. Dolgin,
Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentationof the Ideology of
Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523 (2000)).
16. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b) (LexisNexis 2008).

17. As used in this article, genetic testing means DNA testing. See Jill T.
Phillips, Comment, Who Is My Daddy?: Using DNA to Help Resolve Post-Death
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not repealed altogether. Finally, this article suggests that
more expansive family law regimes for establishing the
parent-child relationship, while appropriate during life, may
not be the optimal approach for inheritance law in post-death
cases since inheritance and family law have distinctly
different policy concerns and goals. 19 Those who draft and
enact intestacy statutes should consider taking a separate
path when creating a simplified model to determine legal
parentage in post-death cases.
II.

SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES AND THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN THE
NONMARITAL INHERITANCE CASES

The United States Supreme Court and the federal courts
have applied the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
analysis to cases involving discrimination on the basis of
illegitimacy in a number of areas, including inheritance law.2 0
In Levy v. Louisiana,2 the Court found a violation of equal
protection in a statute permitting only legitimate children to
bring wrongful death suits.22 The Court also used equal
protection as the basis to review statutes that implicated
nonmarital children in Trimble v. Gordon,2 3 Fiallo v. Bell,24
Lalli v. Lalli,2 s and Caban v. Mohammed.2 6 In Parham v.
Hughes,2 7 the Court used rational basis review to uphold a
statute that barred the fathers of nonmarital children from
Paternity Cases, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 151, 159-63 (1997) (describing the
restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) and polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) methods of analyzing and matching DNA samples).
18. For an example of a similar pre-death presumption see UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 299 (Supp. 2007).
19. Other scholars have alluded to the effects of this distinction on the
evolution of the law: "Perhaps because individuals can opt out of the intestacy
system change in this area of the law has lagged behind changes in other areas.

In family law, children and their parents cannot opt out of rules that determine
results in custody and visitation disputes based on definition of family status."
Susan Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U.
MEM. L. REV. 643, 665 (2002).
20. See Nikki Ahrenholz, Comment, Miller v. Albright: Continuing to
Discriminateon the Basis of Gender and Illegitimacy, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 281,
282-87 (1998).
21. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
22. See id. at 71.
23. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
24. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
25. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
26. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
27. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
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bringing wrongful death suits. 2
The next important
2 9 in which
illegitimacy discrimination case was Clark v. Jeter,
the Court first expressly applied intermediate scrutiny to
such cases. °
"[Tihe Supreme Court has recognized for
several decades that classifications treating illegitimate
children more harshly than legitimate children violate [the]
[E]qual [P]rotection" Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 1
A. Trimble v. Gordon
In Trimble, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an
Illinois statute that prevented a nonmarital child from
inheriting from the child's father unless the child's mother
and father had later married.2
The state's purported
rationales for this statute included promoting two parent
families and enhancing the orderly disposition of estates.3
Justice Powell stated that the Court was using a "not ...
toothless"34 intermediate standard of scrutiny and that the
state statute at issue had no more than an "attenuated
relationship to the asserted goal." 35 A review of the facts of
Trimble illustrates that the Court's view of the purpose of
this particular parentage statute was to remedy the injustice
suffered by nonmarital children as opposed to replicating
decedent's intent, one of the purposes behind intestacy
provisions generally. 6
Deta Mona Trimble was born out of wedlock to Jessie
Trimble and Sherman Gordon.3 7
Deta Mona lived with
Trimble and Gordon from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974. 3s
During that time, the circuit court entered a paternity order
finding Gordon to be the legal father of Deta Mona and
28. Ahrenholz, supra note 20, at 286 n.56 (discussing Parham,441 U.S. at
348-49).
29. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
30. Ahrenholz, supra note 20, at 287.
31. Id. at 303; see also Caban, 441 U.S. at 388-89; Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
32. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S 762, 776 (1977).
33. Id. at 769-70.
34. Id. at 767 (quoting the Court's description of the less than strict scrutiny
applied to classifications based on illegitimacy in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 510 (1976)).
35. Id. at 768.
36. Id, at 775 n.16.
37. Id. at 763-64.
38. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764 (1977).
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ordered him to pay child support.3 9 Gordon did in fact
support Deta Mona and he openly acknowledged her as his
daughter. ° Gordon died intestate in 1974.41 Deta Mona's
mother, Jesse Trimble, filed a petition in the probate court
asking that the court declare that because Deta Mona was
Gordon's daughter, she was also his heir for purposes of
inheriting in intestacy.4 2 The probate court refused to make
such a declaration and instead named Gordon's father,
mother and siblings as Gordon's heirs.4 3 The probate court
did so under the intestacy statute in Illinois at the time
(hereinafter "section 12"), which provided that:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any
maternal ancestor, and of any person from whom his
mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful
issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person
and take, by descent, any estate which the parent would
have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose
parents inter-marry and who is acknowledged by the
father as the father's child is legitimate.4
As the Court noted, "[ilf Deta Mona had been a
legitimate child, she would have inherited her father's entire
estate under Illinois law. In rejecting Deta Mona's claim of
heirship, the [probate] court sustained the constitutionality of
section 12.""
Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld section
12 against all constitutional challenges in In re Estate of
Karas 6 The Illinois Supreme Court handed down a final
judgment in Trimble on October 15, 1975, in essence
affirming the earlier decision in Karas and denying relief to
Deta Mona."
The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held section 12 unconstitutional as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764-65 (1977) (quoting ILL. REV. STAT.
c. 3, § 12 (1973)).
45. Id. at 765.
46. In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234 (Ill. 1975).
47. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 765.
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by "invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy."4 8

B. Lalli v. Lalli
One year later in Lalli, Justice Powell again wrote for the
Court in a five-to-four decision that upheld a New York
statute allowing a nonmarital child to inherit if paternity was
established by adjudication.49 The New York statute was
arguably broader than the Illinois statute struck down in
Trimble because later marriage plus acknowledgment was
not the sole mechanism by which the nonmarital child could
establish his right to inherit.5 0 The state again argued that
its interest in the orderly disposition of estates and the
prevention of fraudulent claims was enough to justify the
disparate treatment of nonmarital children.51 This time the
Court agreed with the state and, using the new intermediate
scrutiny test established in Trimble, held the statute
constitutional.5 2 A review of the facts in Lalli illustrates the
current weakness in the Court's analysis, given the more
recent developments in establishing paternity through DNA
testing with nearly one-hundred percent accuracy.
Robert Lalli claimed to be the son of Mario Lalli, who
died intestate in 1973. 53 Robert's mother, who died in 1968,
had not been married to Mario.54 Robert filed a petition in
the probate court, asserting that he and his sister, Maureen,
were entitled to inherit from Mario because they were his
children. 55 Rosamond Lalli, Mario's widow and administrator
of his estate, opposed Robert's petition.5 6 She argued that
even if Robert and Maureen were Mario's biological children,
they should not take as heirs from his estate under the New
York intestacy statute,5 7 which provided in pertinent part
48. Id. at 765-66.
49. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261, 275-76 (1978).
50. Compare N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 2008),
with 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2 (2008).

51. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268, 271.
52. Id. at 275-76.
53. Id. at 261.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261 (1978). The Court included the statute:
Section 4-1.2 in its entirety provides:
(a) For the purposes of this article:
(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
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that:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so
that he and his issue inherit from his father if a court of
competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the
father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a
proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother
or within two years from the birth of the child.58

Robert acknowledged that no order of filiation had been
entered during Mario's lifetime.59
However, Robert
challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6"
In lieu of an order of filiation, Robert
submitted a notarized document in which Mario, consenting
to Robert's marriage, referred to Robert as "my son," and
affidavits to establish that people had often heard Mario
openly acknowledge both Robert and Maureen as his
children.6
The probate court noted that the statute at issue had
been upheld against constitutional challenges in previous
cases.6 2 It finally ruled that Robert and Maureen were not

that he and his issue inherit from his mother and from his
maternal kindred.
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that
he and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent
jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of
filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the
pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the
child.
(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support
the illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to
inherit from the father in the absence of an order of filiation made
as prescribed by subparagraph (2).
(4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may be made only
by the father, and such motion must be made within one year from
the entry of such order.
(b) If an illegitimate child dies, his surviving spouse, issue, mother,
maternal kindred and father inherit and are entitled to letters of
administration as if the decedent were legitimate, provided that the
father may inherit or obtain such letters only if an order of filiation has
been made in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (2).
Id. (quoting N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 2008)).
58. Id. at 261-62 (quoting § 4-1.2).
59. Id. at 262.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 262-63.
62. Id. at 263.
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heirs, given the requirements of the statute.6 3 The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed.64 The Court of Appeals used the
lowest standard possible by finding that the state merely had
to establish that "there is a rational basis for the means
chosen by the Legislature for the accomplishment of a
permissible State objective." 6
Given the difficulties in
establishing paternity as opposed to maternity, "the State
was constitutionally entitled to require a judicial decree
during the father's lifetime as the exclusive form of proof of
paternity."66
Robert appealed. After Robert appealed, but before his
appeal was heard, the United States Supreme Court decided
Trimble.6 8 Given its decision in Trimble, the Court vacated
and remanded Lalli to allow the New York Court of Appeals
to reconsider its decision in light of Trimble.69 On remand,
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed its original
decision. 0
While Trimble "contemplated a standard of
judicial review demanding more than 'a mere finding of some
remote rational relationship between the statute and a
legitimate State purpose,' though less than strictest
scrutiny," they still found the statute at issue constitutional.7 1
The Court of Appeals distinguished the New York statute
from the statute found unconstitutional in Trimble and found
that the New York statute was "sufficiently related to the
State's interest in 'the orderly settlement of estates and the
dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy
laws,' to meet the requirements of equal protection." 2 The
United States Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, thus
denying Robert Lalli the right to inherit from his father,
Mario.7 3

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 263 (1978).
Id.
Id. (quoting In re Estate of Lalli, 340 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1975)).
Id.
Id.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)
Lalli v. Lalli, 431 U.S. 911 (1975).
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264 (1978).
Id. (quoting In re Estate of Lalli, 371 N.E.2d 481, 482 (N.Y. 1977)).
Id. (quoting Estate of Lalli, 371 N.E.2d at 482-83).
Id.
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C. The Legacy of Trimble and Lalli
Trimble and Lalli involved intestacy statutes-the
default rules used to reallocate property at death when
individuals choose not to opt out of this system by drafting a
dispositive instrument.7 4 Since American inheritance law
allows for freedom of testation, and it has little in the way of
forced heirship (unlike civil law countries), individuals may
use a custom-tailored instrument like a will or trust to alter
the default inheritance scheme embodied in the intestacy
statutes.75
Trimble and Lalli provided the contours of the statutory
proof barriers the Court would find constitutional, given the
substantial state interest in the orderly disposition of estates
and the prevention of fraudulent claims. Trimble established
that a statute allowing a nonmarital child to inherit only if
there has been a subsequent marriage plus acknowledgement
76
was too narrowly drawn and not constitutionally sound.
Lalli provided that a statute allowing for additional or
alternative means of proving that a man was the nonmarital
child's father-an adjudication of paternity pre-death-was
sufficient to meet constitutional muster.7
After Trimble and Lalli, the Court decided Reed v.
Campbell" in 1986.
In Reed, the Court reiterated the
applicability of its ruling in Trimble: that it is
"unconstitutional for a state statute to make the child's
inheritance rights dependent upon the marriage of her
parents."79 The facts of Reed are as follows: Prince Ricker,
Delynda Reed's father, died intestate in 1976.0
The
applicable portion of the Texas Probate Code provided that a
decedent's estate should descend to "his children and their
descendants," but section 42 of that statute required that in
order for a nonmarital child to take, her parents must have

74. See In re Estate of Dulles, 431 A.2d 208, 213 (Pa. 1981).
75. See id. (quoting In re Estate of Dulles, 29 Fiduc. Rep. 141, 148 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. 1979)).
76. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977).
77. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978).
78. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986).
79. RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 130

(2004). Brashier gives an excellent exposition of the issues posed and discussed
herein in Chapter Four of his book entitled "Paternity."
80. Reed, 476 U.S. at 852.
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subsequently married."1
Although Prince Ricker and
Delynda's mother went through a marriage ceremony, it was
held invalid."2
Delynda was born a year after that
8
3
ceremony.
Delynda's father was married three times, in
addition to his relationship with Delynda's mother." Thus,
upon his death he left five marital children in addition to
Delynda."
One marital child was named the administrator of
Ricker's estate. 6 Delynda notified the administrator that
Delynda was claiming a one-sixth share of her father's estate
as his daughter.8 7 The court found that because Delynda's
parents 8were never married, she was not entitled to take as
8
an heir.
Delynda appealed this decision, challenging the
constitutionality of section 42 of the Texas statute.8 9
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals disagreed with
Delynda.9 ° It found that the statute was still viable, even in
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Trimble, because Trimble did not apply retroactively. 9 1 The
Texas Supreme Court refused to hear Delynda's appeal,
noting "no reversible error."92 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed:
Although the question presented in this case is framed in
terms of "retroactivity," its answer is governed by a rather
clear distinction that has emerged from our cases
considering the constitutionality of statutory provisions
that impose special burdens on illegitimate children. In
81. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1956) ("For the purpose of
inheritance to, through, and from an illegitimate child, such child shall be
treated the same as if he were the legitimate child of his mother, so that he and
his issue shall inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred, both
descendants, ascendants, and collaterals in all degrees, and they may inherit
from him.") (emphasis added).
82. Reed, 476 U.S. at 853.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 853-54.
86. Id. at 854.
87. Id.
88. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 (1978).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 853 (citing Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984)).
92. Id.
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these cases, we have unambiguously concluded that a
State may not justify discriminatory treatment of
illegitimates in order to express its disapproval of their
parents' misconduct. We have, however, also recognized
that there is a permissible basis for some "distinctions
made in part on the basis of legitimacy"; specifically, we
have upheld statutory provisions that have an evident and
substantial relation to the State's interest in providing for
the orderly and just distribution of a decedent's property
at death.93
III. THE POLICY GOALS OF INTESTACY LAW AND POST-DEATH
PARENTAGE DETERMINATIONS

A.

The Policy Goals

A closer look at both the policy goals of intestacy law and
the Court's language in these cases is instructive in thinking
about amending post-death parentage statutes.
1. ReplicatingDecedent's Intent
The first goal often articulated in drafting intestacy
statutes is to replicate the presumed intent of decedents.
Such intent would presumably be to benefit persons with
whom the decedent had some natural affinity. But a close
look at Trimble reveals that the Court did not believe that the
legislature had this goal in mind when it drafted the
statutory section aimed at defining the parent-child
relationship for purposes of inheritance. The Comment to the
Restatement (Third) of Property notes that in Trimble, "[t]he
state argued that the statute served its interest in promoting
family relationships, assuring accurate and efficient
disposition of property at death, and mirroring the presumed
intentions of its citizens." 94 The Court "refused to address
'the question of whether presumed intent alone can ever
justify discrimination against nonmarital children,' because it
did not believe that the state enacted the statute for that
purpose." 95 The majority in Trimble noted that:
93. Id. at 854 (footnote omitted).
94. RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF

PROP.:

WILLS

TRANSFERS § 2.5 reporter's note 1, cmt. a (1999).

95. Id.

AND

OTHER

DONATIVE
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To the extent that other policies are
important, legislators enacting state
laws probably are influenced by the
natural affinities of decedents in the
among the categories of heirs ....
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not considered more
intestate succession
desire to reflect the
allocation of estates

The difference in § 12

between the rights of illegitimate children in the estates of
their fathers and mothers, however, is more convincingly
explained by the other factors mentioned by the court
below.... [W~e find in §12 a primary purpose to provide a
system of intestate succession more just to illegitimate
children than the prior law, a purpose tempered by a
secondary interest in protecting against spurious claims of
paternity. . . [W]e will not hypothesize an additional
state purpose .... 96
So, while replicating decedent's intent is an oftarticulated goal of intestacy laws generally, the Court in
Trimble pointed out that it is not the primary purpose behind
these statutes, which tried to provide some avenue by which a
nonmarital child may establish his right to inherit from his
father.
2. Support of Children
Another goal of intestacy law is to ensure that the state
is not left with the obligation of supporting the decedent's
dependents. Facilitating the support of nonmarital children
furthers this goal. It furthers the economic enfranchisement
of these children and reduces the state's need to support
them. This is consistent with the new federal focus on
requiring mothers seeking aid to establish paternity. 97 The
goal of that federal policy is to find some father who will be
responsible to support the child if possible, thus presumably
reducing the burden on the state. Expanding the number of
nonmarital children who can inherit from their fathers serves
a similar policy goal.
3. Rewarding Family Members for Contributions
Another oft-articulated goal of inheritance law is to
reward family members for their economic or other types of

96. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775-76 (1977).
97. See Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity Laws: Securing More
Fathersat Birth for the Children of Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 63-67
(2006).

870

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1:48

contributions to the decedent's accumulation of assets and
even caretaking of the decedent. In this regard, spousal
claims seem more justified than claims by children because
children are less likely to have made such contributions,
especially minor children. The claim of a nonmarital child on
this basis presumably depends on whether the child had a
relationship with the father during life. The nonmarital child
who appears on the scene for the first time after his father's
death will clearly not have contributed to family wealth or
have cared for his father. But this seems be a less significant
goal of intestacy statutes with regard to children generally
and should not weigh as heavily in the analysis of nonmarital
children and inheritance.
4. Accurate and Efficient Dispositionof Estates
A final goal of the intestacy statutes-and I would argue
one that is on a par with presumed intent-is to facilitate the
accurate and efficient reallocation of property at death. It is
essential from a societal point of view that creditors quickly
be made whole so that the decedent's remaining assets can be
distributed within a reasonable time to heirs. The Court in
Trimble was skeptical about the state's argument that the
goal of the statute was to promote family relationships,
noting that "the difference in the rights of illegitimate
children in the estates of their mothers and their fathers
appears to be unrelated to the purpose of promoting family
relationships."98 In fact, these kinds of statutes were aimed
at "proving paternity and the related danger of spurious
claims." 9 To buttress this, the Court notes that "the more
favorable treatment of illegitimate children claiming from
their mothers' estates was justified because 'proof of a lineal
relationship is more readily ascertainable when dealing with
maternal ancestors."" 00 The Court was troubled by the
relationship of the statute to the "[s]tate's proper objective of
assuring accuracy and efficiency in the disposition of property
at death," and found it too narrow in that regard.' ' I would
argue that the Court is, in fact, concerned with establishing
paternity in the genetic sense and that is what it meant by
98.
99.
100.
101.

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768 n.13.
Id. at 770.
Id. (quoting In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 240 (IM.
1975)).
Id. at 770.
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"accuracy." In fact, the Court notes that it would have a
different case-and presumably a constitutional one--"if the
state statute were carefully tailored to eliminate imprecise
and
unduly
burdensome
methods
of establishing
10 2
paternity."
In Lalli, the Court focused on the state's substantial
interest in dealing with the proof and notice problems
triggered by the inclusion of nonmarital children in the group
of children eligible to inherit from their fathers. 10 3 The means
the state chose in Lalli was "designed to ensure the accurate
resolution of claims of paternity and to minimize the
potential for disruption of estate administration." 10 4 The
Court went on to note that the "'availability [of the putative
father] should be a substantial factor contributing to the
reliability of the fact-finding process,"' 1 1 while allowing the
10 6
putative father to defend himself was a secondary purpose.
Thus, limiting the inquiry to the father's lifetime was
justified because "fraudulent assertions of paternity will be
much less likely to succeed . . .when the putative father is
available to respond, rather than first brought to light when
the distribution of the assets of an estate is in the offing."'0 7
The Court noted that any formal method of proof, other than
a judicial decree, would be sufficient to satisfy the state's
interests.0 8 Thus, a more streamlined process which includes
DNA testing for determining post-death parentage would be
consistent with the goal of accurate and efficient disposition
of estates.
B. Reconciling SurrogateRules with Policy Goals in PostDeath ParentageProceedings
The question then becomes what should be done with
statutes, like the one in Maryland, that effectively preclude a
nonmarital child from inheriting if he cannot prove either
written acknowledgement of parentage or open and notorious

102. Id. at 772 n.14.
103. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
104. Id. at 271.
105. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Lalli, 340 N.E.2d 721, 724 (1975)) (alteration
in original).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 271-72.
108. Id. at 272 n.8.
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recognition during the father's lifetime because the child did
not have a relationship with his father? Under current
statutes like the one in Maryland, such a child would have to
establish that his father acknowledged him in writing or open
and notoriously recognized the child out as his own if an
adjudication did not occur during his father's life.1" 9 Should,
and if so, how should, the putative father's paternity be
established at that point simply for purposes of reallocating
the father's property after death? This post-death proceeding
is not going to determine who should care for the child during
life. What should be the focus? Does it make more sense to
focus on the father's presumed intent or the son's ability to
take a share of inheritance that will help establish him
economically and enfranchise him?
With the advent of new methods of DNA testing, it is
clear that the limited type of statute in Lalli should no longer
be upheld under the intermediate scrutiny1n standard
articulated by Justice Powell in Trimble.'
Limiting the
inquiry about paternity to pre-death adjudication (to allow
the father to defend himself) is no longer as substantial a
concern since DNA testing is far less intrusive and can be
done post-death with tissue samples or by testing relatives. 2
The state's substantial interest in the orderly administration
of estates and the prevention of fraudulent claims can clearly
be met by a statutory scheme that allows a nonmarital child
to request testing in a context far less arduous than an
adjudication of paternity. Children or their mothers may well
not want to bring a hostile paternity suit during the father's

109. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (LexisNexis 2008).
110. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
111. See Karen A. Hauser, Comment, Inheritance Rights for Extramarital
Children: New Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add up to the Need for
Change, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 959 (1997) ("Quite simply, with new, accurate
testing that can meet the legitimate state concerns about stale and fraudulent
claims against a man wrongly alleged to be the biological father of an
extramarital child, states will be hard pressed to define even a rational reason
for inheritance discrimination against extramarital children.").
112. Some courts have been willing to exhume a body to do such testing. See
In re Estate of Michael Dennis Tytanic, 61 P.3d 249 (Okla. 2002). In that case,

the court found decedent's brother as personal representative had standing to
seek DNA testing to determine the putative son's paternity. This article
proposes a statutory regime which explicitly denies anyone other than the
putative son standing to request genetic testing for the policy reasons described
infra.
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life if he has not acknowledged the child per se, but is a
presence of some sort in their child's life. 113 The advent of
easy and almost foolproof genetic testing raises the question
of whether any statutory barriers would now withstand the
intermediate scrutiny test applied to nonmarital children
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 14 There is simply no longer an argument that
the state can somehow more efficiently and accurately-the
acceptable goals embraced by the Court in Trimble and
post-death by means other than
Lalli-establish parentage
5
ordering a DNA test.1
As a result of the Court's decisions in Trimble and Lalli,
states can and do have two different inheritance statutes for
marital and nonmarital children (and two different statutes
for inheriting from mothers versus fathers). 116 This outcome
was grounded in the state's substantial interest in the orderly
disposition of estates and the prevention of fraudulent claims.
As long as the statutes are tailored narrowly enough, they
So, for example, the
will pass constitutional muster.
Maryland statute provides that a nonmarital child may
inherit from his or her mother in the same manner as a
marital child." 7 On the other hand, a marital child may
inherit from his or her father simply by virtue of the parents
being married at the time of the child's birth, the so-called
marital presumption."" However, in order for a nonmarital
child to inherit from his or her father, the child will be
considered to be the child of his father only if the father:
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an

113. For one reason this might be true, see infra note 201 and accompanying
text.
114. Hauser, supra note 111, at 892.
115. Id. at 951 n.477.
116. See Linda Kelly Hill, Equal Protection Misapplied: The Politics of
Gender and Legitimacy and the Denial of Inheritance, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 129 (2006) (comparing state intestacy statutes).
117. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(a) (LexisNexis 2008).
118. Id. § 1-206; see Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the
Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 29, 47 (2003) ("[Tlhe
'marital presumption' (sometimes referred to as the 'presumption of legitimacy')
which has its roots in Roman law, held that the husband of a mother was
...
presumed to be the father of the child, unless the husband was sterile,
impotent, or had no access to his wife during the period when conception
occurred. This presumption is sometimes referred to as 'Lord Mansfield's Rule'.
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action brought under the statutes relating to paternity
proceedings;
(2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father;
(3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be
his child; or
(4) Has subsequently married the mother and has
acknowledged himself, orally or in writing, to be the
father.119
Today, the scientific community has seen the advent of
readily available genetic testing in the form of DNA
matching. 120 As one court noted, "[d]ramatic advances in
genetic testing have made it possible to determine paternity
with nearly one-hundred percent accuracy." 12 ' There are even
take-home kits for DNA testing that can establish a genetic
link between a parent and a child. 122 The Comment to the
Restatement cites several courts grappling with the postdeath determination of paternity,1 23 which I would argue is
uniquely in the realm of inheritance law since inheritance is
the primary reason paternity is sought to be established postdeath. For example, in Alexander v. Alexander, the court
ordered disinterment of the father's body noting that:
The bottom line to denying an illegitimate child equal
inheritance rights is that there is a substantial problem of
proof of paternity, especially after the alleged father is
dead. Today, however we are entering into a new era.
Science has developed a means to irrefutably prove the
identity of an illegitimate child's father. No longer are we
dependent upon fallible testimony, nor are we concerned
that the decedent cannot be present to defend himself.
The accuracy and infallibility of the DNA test are nothing
short of remarkable. We live in a modern and scientific
society, and 24
the law must keep pace with these
1
developments.

119. Id. § 1-208(b).
120. See supra note 15.
121. In re Estate of Michael Dennis Tytanic, 61 P.3d 249, 253 (Okla. 2002).
122. Sandra G. Boodman, Too Much Information, WASH. POST, June 13,
2006, at Fl. For an example of these services see GeneSys,
http://www.paternity-answers.com/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
123.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 2.5 reporter's note 1, cmt. b, at 140-42 (1999).
124. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (1988).
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And in Anne R. v. Estate of Francis C., the court
discussed the utility of DNA testing in post-death cases
where the alternative evidence of paternity falls short of
The court
meeting the required evidentiary standard.12
stated:
The existing statutes offer little guidance on how to utilize
DNA evidence most effectively in post-death proceedings..
The legislature is urged to review all relevant
provisions of post-death paternity proceedings .... Until
such time as the legislature acts, this area will be meshed
of remedial and possibly conflicting judicial
in a quagmire
126
responses.
The advent of such readily available testing weakens the
Trimble/Lalli analytical framework that permitted states to
maintain separate inheritance statutes for marital and
nonmarital children. The statutes imposed a higher burden
on nonmarital children and utilized objective behaviors on
the part of the father, e.g., open and notorious recognition to
establish either-depending on your perspective-that the
father thought he was the father or actually was the genetic
father. The Court's endorsement of a separate and more
burdensome statutory scheme for nonmarital children was
grounded in protecting the state's interest in preventing
fraud and the orderly disposition of estates. 27 Now, the
state's interest in preventing fraudulent claims may be
readily accommodated with an inheritance scheme that does
not differentiate between marital and nonmarital children. If
the state wants to protect those interests, it may easily
require the probate court to simply order a DNA test.
Using DNA testing to determine parentage post-death is
both efficient and reliable. 28 It is far more cost-effective than
evidentiary tests based on behaviors that require hearing and
testimony. It stands as an efficient baseline for establishing
the parent-child link when such a link has not been
established during life. Fathers, mothers and their relatives
who do not want nonmarital children included may readily
125. Anne R. v. Estate of Francis C., 634 N.Y.S.2d 339, 343 (Faro. Ct. 1995).
126. Id. (citing Anne R., 634 N.Y.S.2d at 343) (alteration in original).
127. See supra notes 52 and accompanying text.
128. See Veronica Sue Gunderson, Comment, Personal Responsibility in
Parentage: An Argument Against the Marital Presumption, 11 U.C. DAVIS J.
Juv. L. & POLy 335, 347 (2007).
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avail themselves of the opt-out we provide under our
inheritance law. 1 29 In other words, they may write a will.
However, if they do not opt out and the child post-death can
establish a genetic link, he should be able to inherit.
C. Genetic Linkage and Post-DeathParentage
Statutes that provide for alternative or surrogate forms
of establishing fatherhood 130 raise interesting policy questions
131
now that reliable DNA testing is readily available.
"Surrogate rules" include rules like the one in the revised
Uniform Parentage Act' 32 (UPA) that state a presumption of
paternity arises if a man lives in the same household as the
child for the first two years of the child's life and openly held
the child out as his own. 3 3 The Maryland statute provides
that the nonmarital child will be considered the child of his
father only if the father has openly and notoriously
recognized the child to be his child.33 The latter is more than
a presumption-it establishes paternity. The presumption
arising under the UPA is subject to challenge by the father
but becomes conclusive if not challenged within the time
allotted. 135 The Maryland statute has no clear time lines and
129. See supra note 75.
130. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b) (LexisNexis 2008)
(allowing for an adjudication of paternity, a written acknowledgement, open
and notorious holding out, or subsequent marriage with acknowledgement).
131. For a comprehensive list of all of these statutes, see Hill, supra notel16,
131-33 n.14-21.
In order for the out-of-wedlock child or child's kindred to inherit "from
or through" his deceased father, paternity must be established. States
are typically satisfied that the parent-child relationship has been
established prior to the father's death by such events as the father's
marriage to the mother after the child is born, adoption, voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity or a legal adjudication of paternity. In
addition, most states also allow paternity to be established after the
father dies. In order to establish the parent-child relationship after the
alleged father dies, however, the evidentiary standard is often
statutorily raised to a "clear and convincing" test. In addition to raising
the evidentiary standard, a number of states also statutorily limit the
type of evidence which can be used to establish a man's fatherhood
after his death. Fourteen states require that the man publicly held
himself out as the child's father prior to his death.
Id. at 131-33 (footnotes omitted).
132. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 299
(Supp. 2007).
133. § 204(a)(5), 9B U.L.A. 16-17.
134. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2008).
135. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 37 (Supp.
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presumably requires a hearing post-death. Recognition is
less likely to confirm a genetic link and it imposes systemic
costs in the form of evidentiary hearings where testimony
must be taken and judicial discretion exercised. Such a rule
was necessary in years past because there were less reliable
means of determining paternity. It still makes sense if the
recognition becomes conclusive during the father's life in the
UPA regime because the father had a chance to rebut. Given
the state of paternity testing today, open and notorious
recognition makes less sense as a post-death method of
determining parentage in statutes like the Maryland statute
if the original purpose of the recognition rule was to
determine a genetic link between father and child.
If the purpose of the open and notorious recognition rule
was to include nonmarital children who are not genetically
linked, but who the father either mistakenly thought were
linked or felt affection for, such rules might still make sense.
However, this does not seem a likely purpose given the
discussion in Trimble and Lalli. The Court noted the purpose
of these particular intestacy statutes was to remedy injustice
visited upon nonmarital children while ensuring accurate
proof of what I would argue was genetic paternity.
Retaining open and notorious recognition ("holding-out"
rules) poses procedural problems if these statutes are
expanded to include post-death genetic testing as a simple
route to establishing paternity. Even under the revised UPA,
a voluntary acknowledgement
is meant to be an
acknowledgement of genetic paternity and to retain such
rules raises the possibility of circumventing adoption laws (as
the UPA drafters pointed out. 136) So the question is whether
such statutes should still allow for what we might call "false
positives"-a child who was held out by a decedent as his
child but who in fact turns out not to be genetically linked?
Allowing "false positives" to take under intestacy would
arguably be inconsistent with cases that forbid a child to
inherit if he was raised by the decedent but was never legally
adopted and cannot meet the higher burden of the equitable
2007) ("A proceeding . . . to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a
presumed father must be commenced not later than two years after the birth of
the child.").
136. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 19 (Supp.
2007).
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adoption doctrine.
If we use the Lalli137 facts as a hypothetical, there are
two possible scenarios if Robert Lalli were allowed to
establish paternity post-death through a simple DNA test.
Such a test might establish, with virtual certainty, that
Robert was Mario's genetic child. This would be consistent
with the fact that Mario Lalli said Robert was his son in legal
documents, like his consent to Robert's marriage. On the
other hand, such a test might establish that Mario was
mistaken and that Robert was not his genetic child. In that
scenario, we might say that a surrogate rule like
acknowledgement or open and notorious holding out would
yield a "false positive."
I would argue that if the goal of such statutes is to
establish a reliable means to prove paternity in an efficient
and accurate way-as articulated by the Court in Trimble
and Lalli-then it is clear that we should now include in such
statutes a provision whereby Robert can opt to establish his
paternity post-death with DNA testing. But should we still
provide an option for him to establish it through surrogate
means as well? And if we do so, should that effort be open to
challenge by other relatives? The better policy is not to allow
a conclusive adjudication or voluntary acknowledgement
during life to be challenged by other relatives.1 38 But, if a
formal determination of parentage has not occurred during
life, is it fair to allow Robert to rely solely on a surrogate rule
and not opt for DNA testing post-death?
Suppose Robert did not have a relationship with Mario
Lalli during life, but that his mother struggled to raise him
alone. If Robert discovers that his putative father has died
and appears in the probate court post-death to establish
paternity, should we not, given the spirit of Trimble and Lalli
to include nonmarital children as fully as possible in
inheritance, grant him the opportunity to inherit? Is the lack
of knowledge on his father's part, and the chance that
establishing such a fact might upset Mario's existing family,
sufficient to deny Robert the chance to inherit? I would argue
it is not. The Court in Trimble and Lalli clearly held that the

137. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
138. This is clearly detrimental to both the best interests of the child and
raises concerns about fairness and finality ofjudgments.
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state's interest in preserving two-parent, or "legitimate,"
families was an insufficient justification to deny a nonmarital
child a reasonable chance to establish paternity." 9 Although,
in Lalli, the Court found that limiting a nonmarital child's
opportunity to establish paternity to the lifetime of the father
was constitutional, that conclusion was grounded in the
state's interest in accuracy. 140 The father's testimony would
yield a more accurate determination of paternity. That is no
longer a great concern because almost perfect accuracy can
now be established by DNA testing post-death.
The benefits of biological paternity in the context of the
family law goal of establishing parentage with the best
interests of the child as the dominant goal have been
discussed by June Carbone and Naomi Cahn in their article,
In fact, they suggest a mandatory and
Which Ties Bind?'
universal paternity testing regime at birth, which would also
resolve the issue of post-death determination for inheritance
The issue of biology has been central in
purposes.'
inheritance law with its historic focus on consanguinity. Of
even greater relevance is the existing focus on biology
inherent in many state statutes that conclusively establish
that the mother of the child is the mother for purposes of
inheritance simply by giving birth to the child.4 3 Some may
argue that legislatures adopt such a stance because the birth
tie signifies the presumed intent of the mother to include the
child.'" Others might argue that the biological link is the
salient factor sought by the state in concluding that the
nonmarital child "deserves" to inherit from his mother
without any other proof barriers. 145 I would tend to agree

139. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430

U.S. 762, 774-75 (1977).
140. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 271.
141. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the ParentChild Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1011 (2003).
142. Id. at 1069.
143. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-3(1) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 2-109(2) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(3) (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-4107(a)(iii) (2008).
144. See Jennifer Seidman, Comment, Functional Families and
Dysfunctional Laws: Committed Partnersand Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO.
L. REV. 211, 211 (2004) (noting that one purpose of intestacy laws is to give
effect to the presumed intent of the donor).
145. See Timothy Hughes, Comment, Intestate Succession and Stepparent
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with the latter group-that the rationale for such a
conclusive determination of maternity is more grounded in
old notions of consanguinity than in presumed intent, though
both rationales may co-exist.
D. Reconciling the MaritalPresumption and Policy Goals
The availability of DNA testing also raises the question
of whether the presumption that the husband of a married
couple is the father of a child born during the marriage (the
marital presumption) should continue to stand. 14 6
Some
scholars have correctly pointed out that the utility of
presumptions in an age of readily available genetic testing is
greatly reduced since such presumptions are so easily
rebuttable. 4 7 The marital presumption has been assailed as
a matter of male privilege in the past, and arguments that it
is an incentive to marriage seem insufficient to sustain it
under constitutional scrutiny. 48
Justice Powell rejected
furthering two-parent families as a substantial interest that
justifies treating nonmarital children differently from marital
children in the context of inheritance. 149 If, as a matter of
social policy, the legislature chooses to encourage marriage, it
should arguably privilege the spousal relationship rather
than impose burdens on the parent-child relationship. But
the goals of inheritance law include efficiency of
administration and, viewed in light of that goal, the marital
presumption comports very well with inheritance law. 15° The
next section explores a simplified post-death regime for
establishing parentage that retains the marital presumption
Adoptions: Should Inheritance Rights of an Adopted Child Be Determined by
Blood or by Law?, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 321 (1988) (discussing the "natural law
theory of consanguinity").
146. See generally Gunderson, supra note 128. But see Singer, supra note 15.
147. See Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and IntentBased Parenthood:An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
297, 317-18 (1990).
148. Historically, some inheritance law scholars have argued that the rule
which grants children to a married couple unassailable legitimacy was a rule
that privileged men. Mary Louise Fellows cogently lays out the rationale for
Lord Mansfield's rule which excluded any testimony challenging the legitimacy
of a child born to a married man and women. Mary Louise Fellows, A Feminist
Interpretationof the Law and Legitimacy, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 195 (1998).
149. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) (rejecting the argument
that a State may "influence the actions of men and women by imposing
sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships").
150. See BRASHIER, supra note 79, at 6.
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as a starting point and then minimizes the barriers for
nonmarital children who must establish paternity post-death
in order to inherit.
IV. A SIMPLIFIED POST-DEATH PARENTAGE REGIME FOR
INHERITANCE LAW

Embracing a simplified regime in this area begins with
thinking about first principles. Biology has always played a
fundamental role in inheritance law not only because of the
historic emphasis on consanguinity, but also because the
American system of inheritance allows for such easy opting
151
out and disinheritance of any child-marital or nonmarital.
The goals of intestacy statutes include replicating the
decedent's presumed intent as well as, "the continued support
of the decedent's family, rewarding or compensating family
members for contributions to the wealth accumulated by the
decedent or to the decedent's well-being, and ease of
administration of the probate system."15 2
The linchpin of inheritance by or through a child in a
status-based system like ours is establishing that the child is
linked to the parent by either blood or adoption. Once that
link is established, the child may inherit in intestacy. The
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) endorses states' use of the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) as a mechanism to establish
the parent-child relationship." 3 For example, it suggests that
if a state has adopted the UPA, it should incorporate the UPA
by reference to determine parentage.1 5 1 If not, the UPC
151. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who
Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 713 (1984) ("Progress in this
direction has been slow because of the common-law reverence for blood as the
basis of succession. Following the maxim 'Solus Deus facit haerdem, non homo'
(God alone makes the heir, not man), our succession law started with the
assumption that inheritance rights are based on consanguinity and that any
deviation from this principle requires express authorization either by legislation
or by a private dispositive instrument.") (footnotes omitted); see also E. Gary
Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the
Biological Mother's Consent to the Biological Father'sCo-parentingof Her Child,
48 ARIz. L. REV. 97 (2006) (analyzing the constitutional significance of biology
in defining a father's parental rights).
152. Gary, supra note 19, at 651-52.
153. Eighteen states have adopted the UPC, "in some cases with significant
modifications." See Legal Information Institute, Cornell University, Uniform
Probate Code Locator, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008).
154. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (amended 1997), 8(I) U.L.A. 91.
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provides that a state may incorporate its own statutory rules
to determine parentage.'55 A number of states have adopted
the UPA to make parentage determinations
while others, like
156
regimes.
own
their
have
Maryland,
The 2000 UPA (as amended in 2002) establishes a
complex system of presumptions and evidentiary rules
regarding relevance and reliability.5 7 The drafters of the
revised UPA spent many years fleshing out these rules, and
then engaged in a protracted negotiation about the rules after
bringing them to the ABA House of Delegates for approval
and encountering into opposition.'58 The rules in the revised
155. Id.
156. See Legal Information Institute, supra note 153, for current
information.
157. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16-17 (Supp.
2007):
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:
(1) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and
the child is born during the marriage;
(2) he and the mother of the child were married to each other and
the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated
by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce [, or after
a decree of separation];
(3) before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child
married each other in apparent compliance with law, even if the
attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is
born during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its
termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce [, or after a decree of separation];
(4) after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child
married each other in apparent compliance with law, whether or
not the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and he voluntarily
asserted his paternity of the child, and:
(A) the assertion is in a record filed with [state agency
maintaining birth records];
(B) he agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the
child's birth certificate; or
(C) he promised in a record to support the child as his own; or
(5) for the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same
household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.
(b) A presumption of paternity established under this section may be
rebutted only by an adjudication under [Article] 6.
158. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 17
(Supp. 2007) (noting the "objection" of the ABA IRR section). A network of
presumptions was established by UPA (1973) for application to cases in which
proof of external circumstances indicate a particular man to be the probable
father. The simplest of these is also the best known-birth of a child during the
marriage between the mother and a man. When promulgated in 1973, the
contemporaneous commentary noted that:
While perhaps no one state now includes all these presumptions in its
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UPA reflect the underlying family law policy concerns about
continuity and care giving for children, as well as financial
support during minority, embodied in the traditional "best
interests of the child" standard, as do the expansive
definitions of parentage included in the American Law
Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, which
provide for parentage by estoppel and de facto parentage, in
additional to legal parentage. 15 9 Given the policy concerns for
the best interest of the child in raising the child in the family
But inheritance law is
law context, this makes sense.
concerned less with caregiving and more with the transfer of
capital, which translates into economic power, from one
generation to the next. If reducing the stigma and societal
disability associated with children born out of wedlock is an
law, the presumptions are based on existing presumptions of
"legitimacy" in state laws and do not represent a serious departure.
Novel is that they have been collected under one roof. All presumptions
of paternity are rebuttable in appropriate circumstances.
After amendments adopted in 2002, the Uniform Parentage Act retains all but
one of the original presumptions of paternity contained in UPA § 4 (1973).
Originally the 2000 version of the new Act limited presumptions of paternity to
those related to marriage. The objection by the ABA Steering Committee on the
Unmet Legal Needs of Children and the Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities that this could result in differential treatment of children born
to unmarried parents resulted in the revision to this section.
Subsection (1) deals with a child born during a marriage; subsection (2) deals
with a child conceived during marriage but born after its termination;
subsection (3) deals with a child conceived or born during an invalid marriage;
and, subsection (4) deals with a child born before a valid or invalid marriage,
accompanied by other facts indicating the husband is the father.
Added by amendment in 2002, subsection (5), is a significant revision of UPA §
4(4) (1973), which created a presumption of paternity if a man "receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child . ..."
Because there was no time frame specified in the 1973 act, the language
fostered uncertainty about whether the presumption could arise if the receipt of
the child into the man's home occurred for a short time or took place long after
the child's birth. To more fully serve the goal of treating nonmarital and marital
children equally, the "holding out" presumption is restored, subject to an
express durational requirement that the man reside with the child for the first
two years of the child's life. This mirrors the presumption applied to a married
man established by § 607, infra. Once this presumption arises, it is subject to
attack only under the limited circumstances set forth in § 607 for challenging a
marital presumption, and is similarly subject to the estoppel principles of § 608.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 2007)
(quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 379 (2001)).
159. For the tortured history of the Revised Uniform Parentage Act (as
amended 2002), see John J. Sampson, Preface to the Amendments to the
Uniform ParentageAct (2002), 37 FAM. L.Q. 1 (2003). See also AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2002) § 2.03.
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important policy goal, then making sure nonmarital children
share in the economic power that wealth transfer brings is a
tangible means of achieving this goal.
Such economic
disenfranchisement mirrors the inability of women to inherit
in certain countries, which poses serious barriers to their
Similarly, nonmarital
economic and social equality. 16 0
children will continue to face inequality in the form of
economic disenfranchisement if the rules about establishing
post-death parentage in states that have not adopted the
UPA, which allows for post-death testing, are not amended to
include DNA testing.
The policy goals of efficiency and administrative
convenience are dominant concerns in probate. Requiring a
simple DNA test to establish whether a nonmarital child is
actually the child of the decedent father reduces transaction
costs-systemic costs expressed as court time and lawyers'
fees.' 6 ' Simplifying the process whereby nonmarital children
may inherit is efficient because it increases the size of the
societal pie and the individual estate by reducing costs that
the estate would otherwise have to pay. Using DNA testing
is more administratively
convenient than requiring
evidentiary hearings with testimony about whether the
putative father "held out" a child as his own because he sent
62
three Christmas cards or four.
160. See generally Tamr Ezer, Inheritance Law in Tanzania: The
Impoverishment of Widows and Daughters, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 599 (2006).
161. E.g., Sorenson Genomics, Identigene DNA Paternity Test: Legal,
http://www.dnatesting.com/paternity/legalPaternity.php (last visited Mar. 12,
2008) (listing the price of a paternity test kit that will "provide airtight
evidence" and "[tihe proof that's absolutely necessary" as $399. "Home DNA
tests" are even less expensive).
162. Note that even the new 2000 as amended in 2002 UPA acknowledges
that the advent of reliable genetic testing must, by necessity, alter some of the
old presumptions about paternity.
Finally, subsection (b) is a complete rewrite of UPA (1973) § 4(b). The
requirement that a presumption 'may be rebutted.., only by clear and
convincing evidence" was eliminated from the Act. The same fate was
accorded the statement that: "If two or more presumptions arise which
conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded
on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls." Nowadays
the existence of modern genetic testing obviates this old approach to
the problem of conflicting presumptions when a court is to determine
paternity. Nowadays, genetic testing makes it possible in most cases to
resolve competing claims to paternity. Moreover, courts may use the
estoppel principles in § 608 in appropriate circumstances to deny
requests for genetic testing in the interests of preserving a child's ties
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When considering this simplified regime post-death, one
must continue to be cognizant of the expressive dimension of
inheritance law. Some may argue that requiring a genetic
link in cases where legal parentage has not been assigned
during life by other means is regressive and diminishes the
status of those individuals who are not included in the
traditional family. 163 Inheritance law does have an important
function in society in terms of how society thinks about who
makes up a family. However, a revised statutory scheme that
focuses on genetic testing as the primary means of
determining parenthood in post-death cases would actually
reduce barriers to nonmarital children attempting to
establish that they are entitled to take from their fathers. It
would thus enhance their symbolic or social status as
members of a family and enhance their financial well-being
through an economic transfer in probate. In the paradigm
proposed herein, there would be uniformity among states in
the area of inheritance law rather than uniformity between
family law and inheritance law in establishing the parentchild relationship. The proposed regime would only affect a
child whose parent had not gone through a paternity
adjudication during life or for whom a presumption of
parentage had not become conclusive during life. Thus, if a
non-genetic parent wanted to establish legal parentage
during life, that determination would be dispositive and the
child could take from that parent post-death. 6 4 The final
adjudication by a court or presumption which became
conclusive would then be binding on the probate court after
that parent died.
In one sense, biology is regressive since it harkens back
to bloodlines and rules like primogeniture. But, in another
to the presumed or acknowledged father who openly held himself out
as the child's father regardless of whether he is in fact the genetic
father.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 2007).
163. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the
Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227
(2006); Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: DisaggregatingBiological and Social
Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (2006); Allison J. Stone, Comment, "Sisters Are
Doing It for Themselves!": Why the Parental Rights of Registered Domestic
Partners Must Trump the ParentalRights of Their Known Sperm Donors in
California,41 U.S.F. L. REV. 505 (2007).
164. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 305 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16-17 (Supp.
2007).
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sense, it is progressive because, given the reliability and
accessibility of DNA testing, if we use biology as a primary
means of establishing legal parentage for inheritance
purposes in post-death cases, more nonmarital children will
be able to take in intestacy. The reliability and ease of DNA
testing create a more efficient and administratively
convenient disposition for the probate system, which is
concerned less with naming a parent for caretaking purposes
than deciding to whom capital will be distributed. Since onethird of all children are now born outside of marriage, 16 5 it is
time for us to ensure that they will share equally in the
economic power that comes with inheritance.
What we
should be doing is providing a default system that quickly
and reliably determines who is a child based on either a
marriage certificate, a genetic determination, or an adoption
certificate, and move capital to that child.
Family law and inheritance law often have different
goals. For example, the policy goals underlying the question
of who should be legal parents are very different in family
law than they are in inheritance law. As an illustration, in
an early draft of what eventually became the 2000 UPA, the
initial draft contained an absolute rule that no posthumously
conceived child could ever be a child of the decedent. 16 6 There
was no opt-in provision for fathers who wanted to indicate
their intent to have these children be legal children. 167 This
omission was, in part, due to the fact that the dominant
concern of the drafters was a family law concern-continued
post-death child support obligations. 6 The drafters were
family law experts who, unlike their trusts and estates
colleagues, were less concerned with the ability of the child to
inherit, which was linked to a post-death determination of

165. See supra note 1 (citing nonmarital birth statistics).
166. See REVISION OF UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (Discussion Draft 1997),

availableat http'//www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/parll97.pdf:
(d) A donor who dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child
is conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the donor's
egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child.
Id. § 305(d).
167. Id.
168. For example, the ABA Advisor to the Committee was an expert in
divorce and custody, not trusts and estates. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2007) (listing Nina Vitek as the ABA
Advisor).
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legal fatherhood. 16 9 When trusts and estates experts noted
that the draft should include an opt-in provision, such a
provision was incorporated. 170
This embrace of the genetic link as a default position is
motivated in large part by the default nature of American
inheritance rules. American law provides an easy opt-out
" ' If a father or one of
from the default rules of intestacy law. 17
his relatives does not want his nonmarital child to inherit
from or through the father, such person can simply draft a
will. This is very different from parentage decisions made in
the context of family law and regimes established primarily
for determining parentage during life, like the UPA.172 For
purposes of caretaking during life, one may not opt into being
a custodial parent or opt out of child support obligations. But
in terms of being parent for purposes of passing on wealth,
one can and often does opt in and out of that relationship.
Americans often disinherit their children for a variety of
reasons, 73 even if only because they leave their entire estate
to their surviving spouse. In addition, American inheritance
law already relies exclusively on biology to establish the
parent-child relationship with mothers. 7 4 A mother is the
parent of a child-marital or nonmarital-for inheritance law
169. Id.

170. See id. § 707, 9B U.L.A. 53:
Parental Status of Deceased Individual.
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of
the child.
Id.
Absent consent in a record, the death of an individual whose genetic
material is subsequently used either in conceiving an embryo or in
implanting an already existing embryo into a womb ends the potential
legal parenthood of the deceased. This section is designed primarily to
avoid the problems of intestate succession which could arise if the
posthumous use of a person's genetic material leads to the deceased
being determined to be a parent. Of course, an individual who wants to
explicitly provide for such children in his or her will may do so.
Id. § 707 cmt.
171. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
172. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2007).
173. MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 97-103

(1970) (giving examples of wills disinheriting adult children of the testator).
174. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15
(Supp. 2007).
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purposes simply because she gave birth to the child. 17 5
Admittedly, this suggested approach is a departure from
some inheritance law scholars who would expand behavior
based decision-making in intestacy and give courts discretion
to provide for inheritance apart from consanguinity or
adoption. 1 76 But when considering post-death parentage
determinations, which are made primarily for the purposes of
qualifying for an inheritance-not for purposes of
determining who may be the optimal parent for purposes of
caretaking-inheritance law scholars might err on the side of
maximizing efficient disposition and the number of
nonmarital children who eventually inherit. 77 Discretionary
regimes may maximize fairness to some but they slow the
reallocation process. The following proposals are aimed at
reducing some of the discretionary decisions that probate
courts must make under the current regime and easing the
burden on nonmarital children.
V.

STATUTORY REFORMS

So if one were to revise existing state statutes, what
changes would be implemented that might differ from the

175. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(a) (LexisNexis 2001): "A
child born to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with
each other shall be considered to be the child of his mother." (Meaning the
woman who gave birth to him) Although the UPA (2000 as amended 2002)
includes many more ways in which to establish motherhood, most state statutes
still assign motherhood based simply on birth. The UPA provides in § 201:
(a) The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and
a child by:
(1) the woman's having given birth to the child [, except as
otherwise provided in [Article] 81;
(2) an adjudication of the woman's maternity; [or]
(3) adoption of the child by the woman [; or
(4) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child
born to a gestational mother if the agreement was validated under
[Article] 8 or is enforceable under other law].
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 2007).
176. See Foster, Family Paradigm,supra note 8; Foster, New Model from
China,supra note 8; Foster, Chinese Experiment, supra note 8; see also Carissa
R. Trast, Note, You Can't Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by SameSex Couples Are Entitled to Inheritance Rights from Both Their Parents, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 857 (2006); Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the
Inheritance Rights of Marital and Non-Marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1
(2007) (suggesting a more discretionary approach for probate courts in
allocating the estate between marital and nonmarital children).
177. See, e.g., supra note 176.
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current statutory regimes for establishing the parent-child
relationship between nonmarital children and their fathers?
If we look at the Maryland statute, for example, it provides
that a child is the child of the father and mother if they have
participated in a valid marriage ceremony. 178 However, if
they have not, the child will be considered to be the child of
his father only if the father:
1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an
action brought under the statutes relating to paternity
proceedings;
2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father;
3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be
his child; or
4) Has subsequently married the mother and has
acknowledged himself, orally or in writing, to be the
father. 179
When thinking about what a simplified regime would
look like, it is useful to consider which provisions best
reconcile, if possible, the goals that underlie intestacy
statutes.
As discussed above,8 ° these goals include
replicating the decedent's presumed intent as well as, "the
continued support of the decedent's family, rewarding or
compensating family members for contributions to the wealth
accumulated by the decedent or to the decedent's well-being,
and ease of administration of the probate system."'8 ' It could
be that there is irresolvable conflict between some of these
goals in the context of post-death determinations of
parentage. But when deciding which goal should prevail,
when it is impossible to resolve such conflict, thinking about
which goals are paramount becomes a useful touchstone.
Thus, the following analysis of the existing provisions
measures the choices against the goals of intestacy law as a
mechanism for selecting a simplified regime of post-death
determinations of legal parentage.

178.
179.
180.
181.

MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (LexisNexis 2008).
Id. § 1-208(b).
See supra Part III.
Gary, supra note 19, at 651-52.
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A. Should the MaritalPresumptionbe Preserved?
As noted above, 18 2 the marital presumption has been

criticized for privileging marital children over nonmarital
children and by feminist scholars as preserving the vestiges
of patriarchy.18 3 Encouraging marriage by punishing the
children of those who engaged in reproduction outside of
marriage was not an acceptable reason to discriminate
against nonmarital children under Trimble."8 The Court felt
that such social incentivizing should not be visited upon the
heads of children. 85 It would be very consistent to defer
completely to a genetic link for all children, marital and
nonmarital, by arguing that everyone should now be tested
for paternity within and outside of marriage to avoid any
problems of later efforts to disestablish paternity. But the
marital presumption, with all its faults, is efficient. It cuts
down tremendously on the number of cases where a separate
86
determination of legal fatherhood would have to be made.
Thus, because the efficient disposition of estates post-death is
such an important goal of intestacy law, it should be
preserved as a means of establishing legal fatherhood where
such a determination has not been made during life. 8 7
However, nonmarital children may argue that the
presumption is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, now
that DNA testing is readily available. 8' To withstand such a
182. See supra Part III.A4.
183. Historically, some inheritance law scholars have argued that the rule
which grants children to a married couple unassailable legitimacy was a rule
that privileged men. Mary Louise Fellows cogently lays out the rationale for
Lord Mansfield's rule which excluded any testimony challenging the legitimacy
of a child born to a married man and women. Fellows, supra note 148, at 198;
see also BRASHIER, supra note 79, at 125 ("[Until recent decades maledominated legislatures continued to favor laws preventing a nonmarital child
from bringing a[n] ...inheritance claim against the putative father's estate.").
But see Jana Singer, supra note 15 at 256-257 (discussing how an important
purpose of the marital presumption was to protect children); see also Katharine
K. Baker, Bargainingor Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and
Paternal Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 13-14 (2004) (defending the
marital presumption as protective of children born into a marriage, noting that
"preferencing stability over information in this way may make it more likely
that the child will be adequately supported").
184. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
185. Id. at 769.
186. See supra note 1 (stating that the percentage of children born into
marriage was over sixty percent in 2005).
187. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 766.
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
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challenge, the state would presumably have to argue that the
marital presumption is grounded in the state's substantial
interest in encouraging marriage because it is in the best
interests of children. 8 9
B. Should SurrogateRules be Preserved?
The proposed UPA amendments in 2000 had deleted the
alternative that allowed for parentage to be based on a
father's holding out the child as his own.1 90 This alternative
is a classic surrogate rule. After the intense opposition of the
ABA Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section and the
Committee on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children, 191 the
drafters restored this rule with some changes.192 Essentially,
the 2000 amendments would have limited the UPA
presumption of paternity to marital children only.193 After
the negotiated agreement, the presumption again applied to
nonmarital children, if their fathers held them out as their
94
own. 1
The Maryland statute currently provides not just a
presumption through open and notorious recognition or
holding out, but the establishment of paternity itself.'9 5 The
UPA approach makes sense since it is a presumption that
becomes conclusive upon the passage of years if the putative
father has not opted to challenge the presumption. 96 The
UPA is striving for certainty and security for the nonmarital
child through its use of the holding-out presumption.
However, the use of such behavior to determine inheritance
§ 2.5 reporter's note 1, cmt. b, at 140-42 (1999).
189. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767 (discussing the standard that would be
applied, i.e., a "not... toothless" intermediate standard of scrutiny).
190. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Parentage
Act (2000), with Prefatory Note and Comments (and with Unofficial Comments

by John J. Sampson, Reporter), 35 FAM. L.Q. 83, 108 (2001) ("Former subsection
4(4) created a presumption of paternity if a man 'receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child .... ' This presumption
was not carried forward because genetic testing is a far better means of
determining paternity.").
191. Sampson, supra note 159, at 1-2.
192. Id. at 3.
193. See Uniform ParentageAct (2000), supra note 190, at 108 n.17.

194. See Sampson, supra note 159, at 3.
195. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b) (LexisNexis 2008).

196. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 37 (Supp.
2007) (requiring that the "proceeding .

years after the birth of the child").

.

. be commenced not later than two
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post-death is not grounded in the same purposes. Rather,
the purpose is to determine who will inherit the decedent's
assets.
Let us examine why retaining this holding out rule in
post-death cases is problematic in addition to the systemic
costs it imposes via evidentiary hearings. If genetic testing is
an option, but the child claiming does not want to use that
mechanism, and instead chooses to use the holding out rules,
what is the impact on the state's interest in an accurate
determination of paternity? And even if we define the state's
interest broadly to include "expressive intent," what is the
state's interest in avoiding the circumvention of adoption? In
addition, is it fair to allow the child to establish the father's
parentage and not allow relatives to rebut what should really
now be merely a presumption (as it is under the UPA)
through DNA testing?
Using the Lalli hypotheticals posed above, 197 the first
scenario contemplated a relationship where the father open
and notoriously held-out the child. To establish paternity
post-death, the child could either opt to use the surrogate rule
or genetic testing if it is added. But the child would likely not
want to risk DNA testing if he thought he could convince a
probate court through the alternative evidentiary means,
since the DNA test might conclusively demonstrate that his
putative father was not in fact his genetic father. In such a
case, we might feel badly that a child who was held-out might
be eliminated from inheritance because he has chosen to
establish paternity but a relative then is allowed to rebut by
introducing DNA testing to the contrary. But the child has
always had to engage in some sort of hearing to establish that
the holding out or the acknowledgement met a certain level of
proof-in many states by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus, the relatives always presumably had a right to respond
by presenting evidence that the child's proof did not meet the
standard. Would it make much sense to continue to allow the
relatives to present non-genetic testing proof but bar them
from asking for a DNA test in such a proceeding?
In the second scenario,19
the child never had a

197. See Part III.C (exploring possible alternative outcomes of the Lalli
facts).
198. Id.
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relationship with the father and appears post-death to claim
in the probate proceeding. Here, the child would have to use
the genetic testing option since he could not presumably
establish his father's link to him through holding-out or
written acknowledgement. In that case, we would not need to
address the question of whether the relatives would have to
ask for the court to order such tests since the child must do so
to establish parentage.
In the first scenario, we are faced with an end run
around the adoption statutes if we do not allow a court on its
own motion or a relative to ask a court to establish the
parentage by DNA testing. Simply using the holding-out or
informal written acknowledgement to establish paternity,
when DNA testing is available, is the least likely means by
which to meet the state's articulated interest as expressed by
the Court in Trimble and Lalli, i.e., accurately determining
genetic paternity. And it would seem odd for the state to
craft a new statute that includes less accurate mechanisms
when far more accurate means are available. States might
consider leaving such surrogate rules in, but treating them
not as legal conclusions of paternity but rather as mere
presumptions, rebuttable with DNA testing.
Of course, if during life a determination of legal
parentage was made by adjudication or by a presumption
that became irrebuttable by passage of time under the UPA,
such a finding should not be allowed to be overturned postdeath by a relative who asks for the Court to order a DNA
test. Such relatives should only be allowed to use DNA
testing in a defensive posture to rebut when a child has
initiated an action to establish paternity post-death by using
a surrogate rule. They should not be allowed to initiate
proceedings against the child. This approach comports with
fairness, efficiency and the need for finality of such findings.
Some nonmarital children may be disadvantaged by
turning the holding-out provision into a presumption rather
than a conclusive determination. They may discover that
they are not the child of the father if DNA testing is ordered.
But many more who could not afford to hire a lawyer to
establish "holding-out" may find that an inexpensive DNA
test is a far easier way to prove the decedent was their
genetic and thus, legal father. Some might argue that if we
make the holding-out clause a presumption rather than a
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conclusive determination of paternity, we might as well
repeal it. Presumptions in an age of genetic testing have lost
much of their utility and advantage-because they are so
readily rebuttable. 99 However, transforming these rules into
presumptions rather than eliminating them is an incremental
approach which is appropriate in a transitional world. It will
give states some experience in how they fit together with the
new DNA testing rules. Of course, in states that allow for
holding-out to establish paternity during life such
determinations would be conclusive and could not be revisited
post-death. Thus, the ability of relatives to rebut using DNA
testing would not have an impact on these determinations
made during life.
C. Should Later Marriageand/orAdjudication be
Preserved?
Mechanisms for establishing paternity like adjudication
and later marriage should be retained.
Later marriage
should,
however,
be
accompanied
by
formal
acknowledgement,
not
simply
oral
or
written
acknowledgement.
The formal adjudication of paternity
requirement should be retained.
But should a formal
proceeding be the only vehicle for presenting the DNA test
results or should there be an alternative? For example,
either the child can present an adjudication of paternity or
the child can ask the probate court to order tests (especially
post-death).
The concern with relying simply on an
adjudication is that the adjudication still has quasi-criminal
199. A movement toward using genetic links in post-death determinations of
legal parentage does make it more likely that non-genetic nonmarital children
will discover they are not linked. Whether excluding those children from taking
in intestacy is unfair is a policy decision legislatures will have to make, but this
movement will not exclude truly genetically linked nonmarital children and
may well include more of them in inheritance. See Naomi Cahn, Perfect
Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1083 n.16 (2003) ("The

American Bar Association asserts that the UPA actually increases the difficulty
of establishing legal parenthood for nonmarital children because it relies on
proof of a genetic link. '[Tlhe 2000 UPA makes it more difficult . .. for
nonmarital children to have two legal parents.' This reliance on genetic
connection rather than affection or function is reminiscent of the early adoption
law . . . when courts and legislatures struggled, for example, with the

inheritance rights of adoptees versus those with a blood connection to the
decedent.") (citation omitted); see also Naomi Cahn, Children's Interests and
Information Disclosure: Who Provided the Egg and Sperm? Or Mommy, Where
(and Whom) Do I Come From?, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2000).
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and unfavorable connotations in some states. 00 Children who
have good relationships with presumed nonmarital fathers
may be reluctant to initiate these kinds of proceedings for
fear of alienating the parent. So reliance on adjudication
alone seems unlikely to foster ease of paternity determination
for nonmarital children. The New York statute has both
adjudication and a separate provision allowing for test results
as alternative means of establishing legal fatherhood.2 ° '
The DNA validation procedure could be a separate
proceeding akin to the proceeding provided for in many state
probate statutes to determine whether the heir was
200. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 583-86 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the putative father in a paternity determination
should have the benefit of a clear and convincing standard of proof, rather than
a preponderance standard, because "the stigma that attaches to the father...
reflects a judgment regarding moral culpability").
201. The relevant section reads:
§ 4-1.2 Inheritance by non-marital children.
(a) For the purposes of this article:
(1) A non-marital child is the legitimate child of his mother so that
he and his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal
kindred.
(2) A non-marital child is the legitimate child of his father so that
he and his issue inherit from his father and his paternal kindred
if:
(A) a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of
the father, made an order of fliation declaring paternity or the
mother and father of the child have executed an
acknowledgment of paternity... which has been filed with the
registrar of the district in which the birth certificate has been
filed or;
(B) the father of the child has signed an instrument
acknowledging paternity, provided that
(i) such instrument is acknowledged or executed or proved
in the form required to entitle a deed to be recorded in the
presence of one or more witnesses and acknowledged by
such witness or witnesses, in either case, before a notary
public or other officer authorized to take proof of deeds
and
(ii) such instrument is filed within sixty days from the
making thereof with the putative father registry
established by the state department of social services ...
or;
(C) paternity has been established by clear and convincing
evidence and the father of the child has openly and notoriously
acknowledged the child as his own; or
(D) a blood genetic marker test had been administered to the
father which together with other evidence establishes
paternity by clear and convincing evidence.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 2008).
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responsible for killing the decedent.2" 2 When applying the
homicide exception to inheritance, many states allow a
finding in a criminal or civil proceeding to suffice, but if none
exists, the probate court is permitted to make that
determination in a separate proceeding.2 °3 Similarly, probate
courts could be given jurisdiction to order such tests in a
separate proceeding and establish a system of verifying their
reliability, e.g., the results came from a certified lab.20 4
Formal written acknowledgement, if done as the New
York statute requires, is less costly than open and notorious
holding-out in terms of evidentiary proof.2 0 5 Under the UPA
(2000 as amended in 2002), voluntary acknowledgement no
longer provides a mere presumption of paternity-it
establishes paternity. 2 6 The UPA states: "The mother of a
child and a man claiming to be the genetic father of the child
may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with intent to
establish the man's paternity."2 7 The UPA drafters note:
PRWORA does not explicitly require that a man
acknowledging parentage necessarily is asserting his
genetic parentage of the child. In order to prevent
circumvention of adoption laws, § 301 corrects this
omission by requiring a sworn assertion of genetic
parentage of the child. A 2002 amendment provides that
a man who signs an acknowledgment of paternity declares
202. See supra note 9.

203. Id.
204. To ensure validity of testing, drafters of such a new statute might
borrow from states like Louisiana which provides in LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:397 (2008): "The tests shall be conducted by a court appointed expert or
experts qualified as examiners of blood or tissue samples for inherited
characteristics, including but not limited to blood and tissue type. The number
and qualifications of such expert or experts shall be determined by the court."
205. See Part III.C (exploring possible alternative outcomes of the Lalli
facts).
206. Note also the Comment to UPA:
One presumption found in UPA (1973) is not repeated in the new Act.
Former UPA § 4(5) created a presumption of paternity if the man
"acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with [named
agency] [and] the mother does not dispute the acknowledgment within
a reasonable time." This presumption was eliminated because it
conflicts with Article 3, Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity, under
which a valid acknowledgment establishes paternity rather than a
presumption of paternity.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 2007)
(alteration in original).
207. Id. § 301, 9B U.L.A. 19.
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that he is the genetic father of the child. 208
D. Summary of ProposedStatutory Reforms
Thus, once again, the idea that underpins voluntary
acknowledgement, even under the UPA, is one of genetic
connection and statutes like Maryland's should include more
formal acknowledgement as a means of establishing
parentage post-death. Informal written acknowledgement
suffers from the same problems described above that affect
holding-out.2 0 9
Thus, informal acknowledgement and the open and
notorious holding-out option could be eliminated as too costly.
Eliminating these provisions may exclude some children who
thought they were genetically linked to their nonmarital
father. However, the same result obtains in the context of
children who thought they were legally adopted and find out
post-death that they were not. We require a high level of
proof in cases where the doctrine of equitable adoption
applies to allow such children to take an intestate share.
Rather than retaining these surrogate rules, we could rely on
similar equitable principles to develop in the context of
nonmarital children whose parentage has not been
established during the father's life. Otherwise, there seems
to be a significant discrepancy between the treatment of a
non-genetically linked child who finds out she was not
adopted post-death and a nonmarital child who finds out she
is not genetically linked. The latter is currently entitled to a
conclusive presumption of paternity by simple holding-out,
while the former has to hurdle the tremendous doctrinal
barriers of equitable adoption in order to inherit.
208. Id. § 301 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 19 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)).
209. For example, both impose systemic costs in terms of extensive
evidentiary proceedings and both open the door to raise inconsistencies with the
doctrine of equitable adoption. See supra text accompanying note 208. Note
that these statutes are aimed at establishing paternity. While there is the
possibility that they might be used to establish post-death maternity for
inheritance purposes in a domestic partnership where the lesbian partner of the
biological mother has died, the statute is not intended to establish maternity.
Rather than disallowing relatives to use genetic testing to rebut an effort to
establish paternity so that the nonmarital child of such a couple could inherit, a
better approach would be to enact a new statute that is clearly meant to
establish post-death maternity in such a situation. Note that under the regime
proposed herein, if the partner had either established her parentage during life
or made a will the child would be able to inherit.
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In addition, surrogate rules yield "answers" that are not
nearly as accurate as DNA testing if the question is whether
the putative father is the genetic father. There is little
relation between such surrogate rules and the goal of
accurately determining the parent-child relationship for
purposes of inheritance. When redrafting these statues in
2008, a state might argue that its substantial interest is in
preventing fraud. With the advent of reliable DNA testing, a
state could argue that retaining surrogate rules would
actually frustrate the state's substantial interest in
preventing fraud. On the other hand, the state might argue
that the purpose of this particular nonmarital parent-child
statute is consistent with the entire body of intestacy
statutes, which is to replicate decedent's intent. Thus, the
children who have been open and notoriously held-out by
their father are "expressively intended" children, even if they
turn out not to be the genetic child of the father. This is what
the states will have to argue to now maintain that there is a
link between the goal of the statute and the means used to
achieve it. Given these various positions, as noted above, the
most appropriate route in such a transitional world is to
phase-in such statutory change by reducing these surrogate
rules to presumptions rather than eliminating them
altogether. This would allow time for equitable principles to
develop and to see how the two sets of rules interact.
Under the amended regime, the statutory scheme would
provide that a child is a child of the father if the parents:
(1) were married at the time of the child's birth, or
(2) later marry and the father made a formal
acknowledgement of the child and such acknowledgement
has become conclusive during life, or
(3) never marry, but there has been an adjudication of
paternity during the father's life, or
(4)never marry, but the father has made a formal
acknowledgement and such acknowledgement has become
conclusive during life, or
(5) never marry, but through post-death DNA testing, a
genetic connection is established.21 °
210. To ensure validity of testing, drafters of such a new statute might
borrow from states like Louisiana which provides:
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(6) never marry, but the father held the child out as his
own or made an informal acknowledgement and the
presumption of paternity that arises is not rebutted in
post-death probate proceedings.
Thus, surrogate means of proving a man is the child's
father would be reduced to presumptions if there has been no
determination of parentage during life. This approach best
balances fairness, efficiency and constitutional concerns in
today's era of readily available DNA testing. It allows for
accurate post-death means of determining parentage, while
avoiding some of the complexities of more expansive family
law regimes for determining parentage during life for
purposes of raising and supporting the child over a long
period of time.
VI. CONCLUSION

By including DNA testing in the post-death regime for
establishing the parentage
of nonmarital
children,
inheritance law would be moving away from a rule that
currently places "the burden of inertia"211 on nonmarital
children. Children would no longer have to rely solely on
their putative father's actions in holding them out or
acknowledging them, or their mother's actions in filing a
paternity suit during life to establish a parent-child link for
purposes of inheritance.
Such a shift is justified in an
increasingly complex world, where reproduction is often
divorced from marriage or even ongoing relationships. In
such a world, it is highly beneficial to have a clear bright-line
rule with which to resolve whether a nonmarital child may
inherit from his or her father if the issue of parentage has not
been determined during life. Such a rule is likely to include
more nonmarital children in the group of those who inherit,
and will thus reduce social stigmas and enhance their
financial well-being. This is in keeping with the spirit of the
Court's holdings in cases like Trimble and Lalli, that
Selection of expert. The tests shall be conducted by a court appointed
expert or experts qualified as examiners of blood or tissue samples for
inherited characteristics, including but not limited to blood and tissue
type. The number and qualifications of such expert or experts shall be
determined by the court.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:397 (2008).
211. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 (1977).
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nonmarital children deserve to be included in inheritance
regimes whenever possible, consistent with the state's
interest in preventing fraudulent claims.
Legislatures should consider the words of Justice Powell
when he said that "the burden of inertia" should not be placed
on the nonmarital child.212 That principle should still guide
the drafting of default rules in this area of the law today. As
the Powers court noted:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the
bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the
head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover,
imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his
birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the
parent.213

212. Id.
213. Powers v. Wilkinson, 506 N.E.2d 842, 848 (Mass. 1987) (quoting Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).

